I’ve been taking a course over the summer in gay and lesbian studies. I’ve recently submitted a couple of article review assignments. I thought since I’m not writing much else these days that I would share them with you here over the next couple days, and see what discussion might be generated. so without further ado, here’s the first one:
The article I chose to review for this assignment was a chapter from Kate Bornstein’s book, Gender Outlaw, entitled “Naming All the Parts” (Bornstein, 1995). I chose this article because I wanted to review something specifically written about transsexuality and how it relates to both gender and sexual orientation. I will first discuss the main themes of the piece in detail, then particular issues that were raised for me, and finally how the essay contributes to discussion of LGBT issues.
The main themes of Bornstein’s essay have to do with the relation of gender to desire and sexuality. Bornstein, a male to female transsexual, sees gender as an entirely socially constructed system of classification: “Gender means class” (Bornstein, 1995: 21). She argues in this piece that gender as a system must be deconstructed and done away with completely (Bornstein, 1995: 21).
Bornstein discusses how gender functions in society, and where it comes from. She begins by discussing gender assignment, which she states is performed at birth in this culture (North American, western, contemporary), generally by medical doctors, “which shows you how emphatically gender has been medicalized” (Bornstein, 1995: 22). She argues that gender assignment in this culture is performed on the basis of whether or not the child in question has a penis: “It [gender assignment] has little or nothing to do with vaginas. It’s all penises or no penises: gender assignment is both phallocentric and genital” (Bornstein, 1995: 22). Bornstein briefly discusses how other cultures assign gender, showing that the way gender is assigned in this culture is not related to anything “natural” or biological, but rather is a social construct (Bornstein, 1995: 22).
Bornstein writes further on the false notion that gender is biologically based: “It’s biological gender that most folks refer to when they say sex. By calling something ‘sex,’ we grant it superiority over all the other types of gender” (Bornstein, 1995: 30). Here, Bornstein argues that biology isn’t necessarily the most important thing when talking about gender, but that by emphasizing biology, we do just that, thereby marginalizing alternative conceptions and experiences of gender. She goes on to write about the problematic ideology of gender as “natural.” Bornstein writes, “Gender is assumed by many to be ‘natural’; that is, someone can feel ‘like a man’ or ‘like a woman’” (Bornstein, 1995: 24). This is not something she experienced, however, or what drove her own transformation from male to female. Bornstein writes, from her own personal perspective, “I’ve no idea what ‘a woman’ feels like. I never did feel like a girl or a woman; rather, it was my unshakable conviction that I was not a boy or a man. It was the absence of a feeling, rather than its presence, that convinced me to change my gender” (Bornstein, 1995: 24). She argues that the belief in the naturalness of gender “is in fact a belief in the supremacy of the body in the determination of identity” (Bornstein, 1995: 30).
Bornstein advocates doing away with the gender system altogether. She does, however, acknowledge that this raises the question, “if gender is classification, can we afford to throw away the very basic right to classify ourselves?” (Bornstein, 1995: 24). Gender is an identity as well as a classification, a way to belong (Bornstein, 1995: 24). This can certainly be oppressive. Bornstein writes, “In this culture, the only two sanctioned gender clubs are ‘men’ and ‘women’. If you don’t belong to one or the other, you’re told in no uncertain terms to sign up fast” (Bornstein, 1995: 34). However, gender is not just something that is thrust upon us – it is also something we can claim for ourselves.
Bornstein next discusses gender roles, claiming that these teach a person how to function so that others perceive him/her as belonging to a specific gender (Bornstein, 1995: 26). She writes, “Gender roles, when followed, send signals of membership in a given gender” (Bornstein, 1995: 26). Directly related to gender roles, which send out signals as to which gender one belongs, is gender attribution, which happens (for the most part automatically) when we look at a person and attribute a gender to them (Bornstein, 1995: 26). This is important because it affects the way we relate to others (Bornstein, 1995: 26). Gender attribution relies on gendered cues, which we are obligated to give in ways that are clear enough to be perceived by others. These cues include physical cues (hair, body, voice, clothes), behavioural cues (manners, decorum, deportment), textual cues (such as personal history, documentation, and names that support the attribution), mythic cues (cultural myths that support gender attribution, such as ‘weaker sex’, ‘emotional female’, ‘strong male’), and power dynamics (ways of communicating, aggressiveness/assertiveness, persistence, ambition) (Bornstein, 1995: 26-29). Bornstein points out, “In this culture, gender attribution, like gender assignment, is phallocentric. That is, one is male until perceived otherwise” (Bornstein, 1995: 26). A study Bornstein cites found that “it would take the presence of roughly four female cues to outweigh the presence of one male cue” (Bornstein, 1995: 26). Bornstein also includes sexual orientation as a gender cue (Bornstein, 1995: 29).
Bornstein tells about her own struggle with learning feminine cues in order to pass as a woman during her process of “becoming” a woman. Successful “passing” meant that others attributed a female gender to Bornstein (Bornstein, 1995: 27). Many such feminine cues can be seen as harmful to women. She writes, “It wasn’t ‘til I began to read feminist literature that I began to question these cues or see them as oppressive” (Bornstein, 1995: 28).
Bornstein discusses the problematic conflation of biological sex and gender in our society (Bornstein, 1995: 31). This conflation leads to another conflation – that of gender with sex (the act). She points out that gender isn’t the only thing that is confused with sex in this culture – “we’re encouraged to equate sex (the act) with money, success, and security; and with the products we’re told will help us” attain these things (Bornstein, 1995: 31). Bornstein asserts that “it’s important to keep gender and sex separated as, respectively, system and function” (Bornstein, 1995: 31).
Bornstein goes on to discuss sexual orientation/preference as a factor in both sex and gender (Bornstein, 1995: 32). She quotes Murray S. Davis as saying that “the gender component of identity is the most important one articulated during sex. Nearly everyone (except for bisexuals, perhaps) regard it as the prime criterion for choosing a sex partner” (Davis, in Bornstein, 1995: 32). Bornstein argues that sexual orientation/preference is solely determined by the gender of one’s partner, and that sexual desire is meant to fit into one of only a short list of models: heterosexual, gay male, lesbian, or bisexual (Bornstein, 1995: 32).
Bornstein discusses variants on these gender-based relationships, such as heterosexual female with gay male, gay male with lesbian female, lesbian female with heterosexual female, gay male with bisexual male , etc. (Bornstein, 1995: 33). These variants each “forms its own clearly recognizable dynamic, and none of these are acknowledged by the dominant cultural binary” of heterosexual/homosexual (Bornstein, 1995: 33). Furthermore, all of these models, and their variants, depend on the gender of both participants. This is problematic because it “results in minimizing, if not completely dismissing, other dynamic models of a relationship which could be more important than gender and are often more telling about the real nature of someone’s desire” (Bornstein, 1995: 33). Some of these other dynamic models include butch/femme, top/bottom, reproductive models, multiple-partner models, monogamous models, and non-monogamous models (Bornstein, 1995: 33-34).
Moreover, Bornstein argues that “there are plenty of instances in which sexual attraction can have absolutely nothing to do with the gender of one’s partner” (Bornstein, 1995: 35). For instance, Bornstein suggests that sexual preference could be based on sex acts rather than on the gender of one’s partner (Bornstein, 1995: 36), because sex acts don’t have to be heterosexual or homosexual (Bornstein, 1995: 37). For example, Bornstein gives a very elaborate code by which participants use coloured handkerchiefs worn on either the left or right side of the body that indicate their preference for particular sex acts, and whether they prefer to play a top or bottom role in such acts (Bornstein, 1995: 37). Here, the gender of the partners is less important than their willingness to participate in particular sex acts in particular ways.
Nevertheless, our culture is one that does conflate sex and gender, and codifies sexual preference along these lines – which results in lumping together very different subcultures into one catch-all category that is binaurally opposed to the dominant sexual culture, heterosexuality (Bornstein, 1995: 37). Bornstein writes,
A dominant culture tends to combine its subcultures into manageable units. As a result, those who practice non-traditional sex are seen by members of the dominant culture (as well as by members of sex and gender subcultures) as a whole with those who don non-traditional gender roles and identities. (Bornstein, 1997: 38)
Bornstein writes that people are still attracted to her, despite not having a clear-cut gender identity (Bornstein, 1995: 38). She goes on to say that this made her feel nervous at first, as she thought, “What kind of pervert… would be attracted to a freak like me?” (Bornstein, 1995: 38) She identified this fear as internalized phobia about her transsexualism; however, she says she still doesn’t know how to respond to a man’s attraction to her (Bornstein is a lesbian) (Bornstein, 1995: 38-39).
Bornstein finishes her essay with a discussion of desire and how it relates to gender. She writes, “Given that most romantic or sexual involvements in this culture are defined by the genders of the partners, the most appropriate identity to have in a romantic relationship would be a gender identity or something that passes for gender identity, like a gender role” (Bornstein, 1995: 39). Even without a gender identity, with something like a gender role, we can still navigate the waters of sexual relationships. Gender is, Bornstein argues, an identity that can be used to manipulate desire (Bornstein, 1995: 40).
Whenever Bornstein advocates the dissolution of gender altogether, the objection is raised that without gender, how can there be desire? (Bornstein, 1995: 38) Bornstein acknowledges that this culture is one that is “obsessed with desire: it drives our economy… No wonder I get panicked reactions from audiences when I suggest we eliminate gender as a system; gender defines our desire, and we don’t know what to do if we don’t have desire” (Bornstein, 1995: 40). She goes on to write, in perhaps the most important insight of the essay, “Perhaps the more importance a culture places on desire, the more conflated become the concepts of sex and gender” (Bornstein, 1995: 40).
However, this conflation is ultimately limiting, says Bornstein. By having these gender identities to rely on in our personal journeys, we are prevented from examining our preferences and identities more fully:
If we buy into categories of sexual orientation based solely on gender – heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual – we’re cheating ourselves of a searching examination of our real sexual preferences. In the same fashion, by subscribing to the categories of gender based solely on the male/female binary, we cheat ourselves of a searching examination of our real gender identity. (Bornstein, 1995: 38)
Bornstein’s essay raises a number of excellent points and issues for me. Firstly, the relationship between gender and sexual desire was intriguing. Certainly, it seems true that the primary criterion for the vast majority of people in choosing a sexual partner is that person’s gender in relation to their own. I appreciated Bornstein’s discussion of other ways to define sexual desire, like by preference for sex acts, as well as her encouragement for us all to examine how desire functions in our sexual lives outside of gender. In light of this idea, it seems right that Bornstein should advocate the dissolution of gender as a system.
However, doing so seems like a dangerous and frightening thing. As Bornstein says, gender is a kind of identity. The right to determine our own identities without punishment is, I think, much more important than eliminating the options available to us for self-definition. It’s the forced nature of gender as a system of classification, the rigidity of that classification once it’s been determined, and the binary of male/female that is problematic. There is nothing wrong with being a “man” or a “woman” – what is wrong is the unequal valuing of those identities and the subsequent oppression of both all the members of one of the binary options and everyone who doesn’t fall into either of the options.
The other major issue raised for me by Bornstein’s article is regarding the nature of desire. I thought a lot about LGBT politics and the fight for equal rights within that community, and the debate about why queer people are queer – is one born queer, or does one choose to be queer? For so long, and still in some circles, the belief is very clear that people are born queer. Saying that you’re born queer is a biologically essentialist argument, but it can carry some weight politically – as a society, we have decided (at least rhetorically) that it isn’t ethical to punish or discriminate against people because of something that they’re born into, that they cannot help. Of course, this kind of discrimination happens all the time against people for things they cannot help: sexism, racism, ableism, to name a few. But rhetorically, we have a notion of human rights that stands most definitely against such discrimination, and it is considered unethical. However, biological essentialism in any form is problematic.
I don’t necessarily believe that we choose our sexual preferences. I think it is far more complex than that, because I am inclined to believe that our sexual identities are socially constructed and it is not without a good deal of self-examination that we can break free of compulsory heterosexuality. But yet, I think a discourse of freedom of choice is a far more tenable position from which to argue for LGBT rights. It is unethical to discriminate against others because of the choices they make (within limits, of course, such as not hurting others and obtaining consent). People make choices all the time that are protected by law. Why should sexual preferences be any different? So what if someone “chooses” to be queer? Why should that “choice” be any less valid than the “choice” to be straight?
In conclusion, I think Bornstein’s writing is very important to discussions of LGBT issues. Hearing from people who experience transsexuality is vitally important to furthering understanding of trans issues, and to furthering political solidarity among gender-marginalized groups. Finally, because her writing is so personal, it encourages us to examine our own gendered experiences. The personal is, indeed, political.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bornstein, Kate (1995). “Naming All the Parts” in Gender Outlaw: On Men, Women, and the Rest of Us. New York: Vintage Books. 21-40
I’m intrigued by the notion that sexuality is a choice. The preponderance of modern scientific literature I have seen has indicated that it is hormonally determined – and, ultimately, our hormones do rule us. (This is something no one is all that comfortable with, none the less, it is a hard truth.)
Our choice as human beings is how we choose to react to our and other’s hormones. Even heterosexual persons will, on occassion, be attracted to a person of the same sex, mostly due to pheromones. (Yes, they are real.)
I cannot agree that gender, in and of itself is a social construct. Rather, gender is used as an excuse to confine identity. This is somewhat borne out historically. There were always the exceptions of that man or woman who took on the gender role of the opposite sex and who was treated as that sex in all but “medical” terms.
One thing I am curious about is whether Ms. Bornstein ever investigated how other cultures treat hermaphroditism. There are cultures where it is a third gender that is allowed to be recognized into one of the two main genders by how that person’s behavior manifests itself. Unfortunately, I don’t recall where I came upon the idea, but this has been used to support the idea that hormones and chemicals have a great deal to do with sexual/gender roles.
Medicalization, while not always a good thing, can actually contribute to this discussion. Just because someone is outwardly a man or woman, they may not be such on the hormonal level.
Now, the real question is when are we going to get past the argument about gender and realize that there are differences between men and women that in NO WAY make one less than the other. (All of these have to do with bodily function – especially once you recognize that the endocrine system is a bodily function.)
Once upon a time I did not believe that hormones and such dictated much of anything about a person’s personality or role, but I can’t deny the evidence in my reading or experience.
Pax,
MLO
MLO – thanks for reading.
I too am intrigued by the idea that sexuality is a choice. I’m not sure whether it is or not, and I don’t disagree that hormones and pheromones play a role in desire.
but it seems to me that a lot of what turns people on has to do with something that is socially constructed. I am most definitely in the camp of ‘gender is a social construct’ – oh yes, I think it absolutely is. Gender is about the roles we play, the way we relate to one another. There are too many counter-examples of people who do not match traditional conceptions of “man” and “woman” for gender to be biological.
I’ve done quite a bit of reading on intersexuality, and actually, I think intersexuality presents a much stronger case for gender – and sex itself, actually – as a social construct. There is a whole segment of the population who are born with genitals and/or gonads and/or chromosomes that don’t fit the “standard”, yet we stream those people into one of only two options which happen to be binary opposites. and medicine has played a huge role in this, as these infants and young children are subjected to often multiple surgeries in order to construct genitalia and gonadal structures that match what society has deemed “normal” for a boy or a girl. In some other cultures intersexuals are permitted to choose which gender to live as, sometimes they can change their mind later if they want to. Sometimes they are considered as a third sex, this is true, and carry their own special roles within that society. but the very fact of differences in the treatment, acceptance, etc. of intersexual people indicates that gender is socially constructed, not “natural” whatever that is.
I’m with you, thought – I’d like for us to stop having to argue about whether gender is a social construct or not, and for us to stop having to argue about the “biological” differences between men and women. They are far fewer than we make them out to be, and they are not at all important, and in no way do they justify the oppression of one half of the human race for millenia.
oh, I forgot: old post on social construction
you might also like this one
For what I think is an unimpeachable case for gender being the result of biology, please see TS 101
I’m in an unusual position, as one of the rare “serial hermaphrodites”. People such as I look mostly or completely like one sex at birth, then by natural change, look mostly or completely like the other over the course of their lives. 5ARD and 17BHD deficiency are the two most common causes, but there are others, including a number of rarer ones not fully understood.
Mine is IPSR – Ideopathic (meaning not fully understood) Partial Sex Reversal. “Partial” is to distinguish it from other cases of animals who can go from fully fertile F to fully fertile M or the reverse. That doesn’t happen in humans. Most are sterile before or after, though some are merely infertile males (before or after). The female reproductive system is far more complex than the male one, after all.
Good job I’d always known I wasn’t a guy, or I don’t think I would have survived it. Imagine if you had suddenly sprouted facial hair, grown muscular, and had male genitalia descend from what everyone thought was a normal vagina? That happens to 1 in 100,000 people. Some of whom are actually women (ie the parts of the brain that dictate gender are feminine).
I would have liked to have been a normal woman, able to bear children but that was never a possibility. Some Intersexed people identify as neither M nor F, and I feel that should be their right. Most just want to fit in with the normal bi-gendered worldview though, as normal men or women. That is also a valid view.
Now Gender might be dictated by the brain, but Gender Roles are mostly a social construct. All the brain’s morphology can do is to set potentials, potentials that may never be actualised. Some potentials have a strong correlation to biological gender, but there will always be men with typically female potentials in terms of verbal communication ability, and women with typically male potentials in terms of visio-spatial relationship perception. We have to treat people as individuals, and not stunt their intellect by preventing them from taking roles the majority of their gendered cohort is less fit for.
That only 8-12% of engineers are women cannot be explained by biology alone. The ratio should be much higher, perhaps 30%, based on neurology. The rest is caused by social factors. The same thing for male kindergarten teachers. Sexism, the expectation that what may be sometimes true for the majority is always true for all, is rampant, and has resulted in injustice for individuals, and waste of potential or society as a whole. Worse, the Glass Ceiling exists, where women tend to get discriminated against even in areas they typically shine in.
Alan’s CV was more highly regarded than Zoe’s is, even though they are otherwise identical. People like me give good experimental confirmation of that. Barbara’s CV was less highly regarded than Ben’s, as Dr Ben Barres wrote in the NY Times.
One problem is that to say that biology plays any role at all leads to accusations of Sexism and is regarded as extremely un-PC by progressive forces. To say that Gender Roles are social constructs causes apoplexy to conservatives. Between those two, Science has little chance of making rapid headway, though the facts always win out in the end.
thanks for your perspective, Zoe. While reading the post you linked to, I kept thinking to myself, however, “none of this proves that gender is biological” – it’s a circular argument that begs the question. By presuming that there is such a thing, rooted in biology, as a “female” brain or a “male” brain, it’s all still trying to fit everything fairly neatly into dichotomous categories. the argument is based on a presumption that is itself taken to be proof for the argument.
I don’t believe that sex is dichotomous at all – I think SEX itself (not “man” and “woman” but “male” and “female”) is just as socially constructed as gender. And really, intersexuals are a good indication of that – obviously, there is a scale or spectrum and not two clear opposites. Sex is constructed socially; look at what happens to intersexed babies in the vast majority – physical interference with their little tiny genitals so that we can maintain a binary sex system. it’s pretty fucked up, really – what would be the harm in acknowledging that people exist who fit somewhere along the spectrum between male and female as we traditionally think of them?
so, when I look at the argument in the post, I see arguments about “male” and “female” brains as being based on socially constructed ideas of what is “male” and “female.” It presumes a biological dichotomy that is evidentially false – and shown to be so by people like yourself.
Do we really grant the biological binary precedence over the gender as a continuum by using the word ‘sex’? I don’t see it. And neither do linguistists and sociologists who use that distinction between biology and the social dimension. I would argue that the latter is more important.
However, I do understand Bornstein’s point to some extent. It is true that biology is for many an excuse to argue in favor of essentialism.
And yet — the biological binary works as a simplification organizing thinking. We cannot get rid of simplifications, however harmful they might be. We wouldn’t be able to take a stand without them.
So I see no point in debunking them. The biological binary does not suggest that intersexuality does not exist, it explains it as a coalescence of male and female characteristics. Hence, it does, in a way, help to understand it. I should hope…
What I would argue against are essentialist conceptions of gender formed on the basis of biological sex.
Let’s not “deconstrust” ourselves entirely, because we’ll end up totally confused, but instead let’s make sure we all understand the labels we are using.
Zoe Brain, thanks for mentioning this:
That only 8-12% of engineers are women cannot be explained by biology alone. The ratio should be much higher, perhaps 30%, based on neurology. The rest is caused by social factors. The same thing for male kindergarten teachers.
I remember when in one of my linguistics classes I learned about the gender-as-culture hypothesis. Girls and boys are brought up in semi-separate worlds. They are encouraged to play with their sdame-sex peers more often than with those of the opposite sex, they are taught what the “appropriate” patterns of behavior are and chastised for not conforming to them (tomboys, boys playing with dolls). And school institutionalizes these practices. It really is suggested to girls that the “appropriate” disciplines for them are humanities and social sciences AND that they are presumably ill-disposed to do well in math and science. That’s how we get so few women engineers and so few men kindergarten teachers.
I heard about a project in the UK, in the 1980s, I think, called GIST (Girls into Science and Technology). Its implementation led to a rise in women’s enrollment in technical universities. Interesting what we learn, no?